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Livestock production in Nebraska is a very essential part of the state’s economy
with cash receipts from all livestock and products valued at $11.9 billion in 2013 (NDA
2015b). The Livestock Friendly County Program (LFCP) was instituted by the Nebraska
Legislature in 2003 to further promote livestock development in the state. This thesis
examines whether the program has had its intended impact for both cattle and hog farms.
The analysis draws on the theory of long-run competitive equilibrium as a guide for the
specification of the cattle and hog models. Three alternative specifications of the models
using different sets of control variables are used as a test for the robustness of the effect
of LFCP.
Results show that while LFCP was robustly statistically significant and positively
associated with cattle farm numbers across the three specifications of the model, it was
robustly positively associated with hog farm numbers but statistically insignificant. This
may be due to counties having more stringent regulations for hog farms despite the
livestock friendly designation.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Statement of the Problem
Livestock is an essential part of the economy in Nebraska. The Nebraska
Department of Agriculture (NDA) reported Nebraska as first in the nation in 2013 in beef
and veal exports, valued at $946 million. According to the NDA, every dollar spent on
agricultural exports generates $1.22 in economic activity, which equates to beef and veal
exports generating over $1.1 billion for Nebraska. In 2014, the state was first in
commercial red meat production, commercial cattle slaughter, and cattle on feed. In
terms of hog production, it ranked sixth in the number of all hogs and pigs on farms with
3.1 million head in 2014. It also ranked seventh in commercial hog slaughter with over
7.1 million head slaughtered in that same year. Cash receipts from all livestock and
products were valued at $11.9 billion in 2013. This is over half of the total cash receipts
for agriculture in that year (NDA 2015b).
A significant amount of the workforce is tied to farming and ranching. Livestock
processing is the largest employment class in the entire state (NDA 2015b). Continued
growth of this industry is considered essential to maintain the prosperity of Nebraskans,
particularly those in more rural areas. Moreover, given that the average age of principal
farm operators in Nebraska is 55.7 (USDA 2012), continued growth would also require
bringing in younger and newer livestock producers.
To that end, the NDA developed the Nebraska Livestock Friendly County
Program (LFCP). Introduced in 2003, the LFCP was designed to allow counties to
voluntarily join and, when approved, assist them in promoting livestock development
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(NDA 2015a). LFCP is a way for counties to signal to livestock producers that they are
willing to continue developing the livestock industry. In the words of Greg Ibach,
Director of the Nebraska Department of Agriculture, “a big part of the [LFCP] program is
to show that Nebraska is putting out the welcome mat for livestock” (Nebraska Farmer
2014).
NDA evaluates a county’s zoning requirements relative to the NDA’s LFCP
county zoning guidelines. These county zoning regulations are used to establish setback
guidelines for how far away a livestock facility can be from water sources, a neighbor’s
residence, or a nearby town. The NDA’s setback guidelines are can be seen in Figure
2.1. By reducing county zoning setback requirements, livestock producers starting an
operation should theoretically have an easier time obtaining a county zoning permit. As
Figure 2.2 shows the NDA also showcases on its website the 29 counties that have so far
received this designation (NDA 2015a).
As the program is in its second decade, an important question, which this thesis
addresses, is whether or not the program has achieved its intended effect. The question is
not only of academic interest but also of its practical policy relevance. If, for example,
the program is not achieving its intended objective, the state may have to devise
alternative policy instruments to promote livestock growth within its boundaries.
While research studies of the impact of LFCP per se are, to the author’s
knowledge, nonexistent; the topic fits within the larger body of academic literature that
examines the effect of demand and cost conditions on business location. As discussed in
the literature review section, such conditions include taxation (e.g., Goetz 1997; Helms

8
1985; Wasylenko 1997), environmental regulation (e.g Gray 1997; Bartik 1989; Azzam
et al. 2014), and antitrust enforcement (Feinberg, 2014). In a way, LFCP is a form of
environmental regulation intended to incentivize firms to locate in the state.
1.2 Objectives
The objective of this thesis is to examine the impact of the Livestock Friendly
County program on livestock expansion in the state. For methodology, this research
draws on the theory of long-run competitive equilibrium, similar to Azzam et al. (2014)
to specify an empirical model that considers among other factors, the impact of the LFCP
on the number of livestock farms in Nebraska. County level data from the USDA
National Agricultural Statistics Service, the US Census Bureau, and the US Bureau of
Economic Analysis are used in the analysis.
1.3 Organization of the Study
Chapter 2 describes the Livestock Friendly County Program. Chapter 3 reviews
the relevant literature. Chapter 4 presents the econometric model, data, and estimation
results. Chapter 5 provides a summary and conclusions.
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CHAPTER 2: THE LIVESTOCK FRIENDLY COUNTY PROGRAM
The LFCP was initiated in 2003 by the Nebraska Legislature and is administered
through the NDA. The goal of the program is to help counties promote the livestock
industry. Counties voluntarily apply to be admitted into the program. Each application is
evaluated by the NDA to determine if the county is taking measures to support livestock
development. One of the main ways the NDA evaluates a county is based upon the
counties zoning laws pertaining to livestock. These zoning laws set regulations for how
far a livestock facility can be from water ways, lakes, neighboring residences, and towns.
The NDA’s setback guidelines for acceptance in to the program can be seen in Figure
2.1. The Nebraska Department of Environmental Quality (NDEQ) also has a set of

Figure 2.1: NDA Setback Guidelines For LFCP

livestock waste control regulations that a facility must first meet. Unlike county zoning
the NDEQ regulations do not pertain to how far a facility must be from a town, only how
far it must be from public drinking water sources (NDEQ 2015). If the county zoning
regulations are overly strict, the county may be required to relax them in order to receive
livestock friendly designation. With relaxed county zoning laws, it would theoretically
mean that a livestock facility should have an easier time obtaining a zoning permit to
operate. Once in the program the NDA will periodically review the counties to make
sure that they are continuing to positively influence livestock expansion.
In the inaugural year of the program, none of the counties signed up. It was not
until 2005 that a county finally entered the program. The following years, 2006 and
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2007, 2 counties and 5 counties signed up, respectively. Seven counties signed up in
2012, which is the most of any year in the program’s history. A full breakdown of the
dates when each county signed up can be found in Appendix A. Currently there are 29
counties that are a part of the program. As can be seen in Figure 2.2 below, they are
spread all over Nebraska. In the time period that this study evaluates, 1997-2012, there
were 21 counties that had joined the program. The number of livestock operations within
the participating counties also varies widely. Cuming County, which has the most cattle
on feed in the state, is in the program. The county was also first in total number of hog
farms in 2012. In contrast, Grant and Kimball County, which as of 2012 have no cattle
on feed, are also in the program. Grant County does not have any hog farms, and
Kimball only has ten hog farms which contain a total of 101 head (USDA 2012b).

Figure 2.2: NDA Livestock Friendly Counties Map

Until 2015 there was no financial incentive for counties to sign up for the
program. In 2015, the Nebraska Unicameral provided financial assistance for roads and
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bridges in designated livestock friendly counties (Aiken 2015). Prior to this, the
incentive came in the form of free advertising and promotion from the NDA. The NDA
states that while department staff are out on trade missions and trade promotions they will
also be promoting the counties in the LFCP (NDA 2015a). This promotion is to let
livestock producers know which counties are supportive of the livestock industry. The
goal of this is to encourage producers to set up livestock facilities in those respective
counties which, would in turn, stimulate economic growth.

12
CHAPTER 3: REVIEW OF LITERATURE
The literature pertinent to this thesis is the literature that examines the effect of
demand and cost conditions on business locations across states in the United States.
Since the LFCP is different than many of the policies that are evaluated in the literature,
it is important to look at an array of policies. By examining these different policies it
allows for a better understanding of how they affect business location decisions, and thus
how a program such as LFCP may affect location as well. As shown by Feinberg (2014),
different studies emphasize different conditions. These conditions include: (1) the effect
of state taxes on business location (e.g., Wasylenko 1997; Helms 1985; Bartik 1989), (2)
the effect of general business climate on business entry, these include studies on the
impact of environmental regulation and anti-corporate laws (e.g., Bartik 1988; Gray
1997; Schroeter et al. 2006; Azzam et al. 2014), and (3) the effect of state antitrust
enforcement (Feinberg 2014). These different conditions will be outlined by a selection
of papers for each. The papers selected have some attributes that this study uses to help
direct the empirical model to be specified and estimated in the next chapter.
The first condition revolves around the effect of taxes on business location.
Reducing taxes is one of the main ways used to influence firm decisions to choose a
location. This is similar to the goal of LFCP in that the reduction in zoning regulations
will lead to an increase in firm numbers. With regards to taxes, Wasylenko (1997)
reviewed the literature on the effect of state taxes on business location. The most
common dependent variables authors use in modeling are income, employment,
investment, plant expansions, relocations, and births. These variables are used because
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they constitute different ways of expressing economic growth. The independent variables
used are labor, energy, capital costs, taxes, public expenditure, and agglomeration
economies. The studies also include demographic and labor characteristics, such as
market size, population, rate of unionization, and right-to-work laws as variables. They
are similar to the variables used in the models of the papers that will be discussed in this
chapter. They also coincide with other studies that reviewed the literature such as in
Arauzo-Carod et al. (2010).
Wasylenko concluded that state taxes have very little impact on the location
decision of firms. However, he discovered that when there is a large difference between
the average tax levels of economic-rival states; the taxes can have a large impact on
location, employment, or investment. Even though Wasylenko was only evaluating taxes
at the state level, the reasoning would apply at the county level, as is the case of the
LFCP.
In another study on taxes, Helms (1985) used a time series-cross sectional
approach to evaluate how state and local taxes affect economic growth. In the model,
Helms used state personal income as the dependent variable. For the explanatory
variables Helms separated them in to three categories: (1) taxes and other revenue, (2)
public expenditures, and (3) demographic and labor characteristics. The taxes and other
revenue included property taxes, other state and local taxes, and user fees. These were
expressed as a percentage of state personal income. Helms aimed to show that it was
important to not only look at how revenue was collected but also how that revenue was
spent. That was why the second category of public expenditures was included. This
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encompassed money spent on highways, public health, education, transfer payments, and
other expenditures. The last category included relative wage, unionization rate, and
population density. What the research concluded was that if the revenue generated is
spent on transfer payments economic growth will be significantly decreased. But when
the revenue is used for public services that benefit business related activities, the benefits
gained would outweigh the negatives.
Bartik (1989) found similar results in the research of small business entry.
However Bartik’s model differed from that of Helms as it used both a cross section
approach and a panel data analysis. In Bartik’s model, small business starts were used as
the dependent variable. Bartik’s model used a large number of independent variables that
were listed in seven different categories; market demand vs supply variables, factor price
variables, tax variables, public service variables, financial market variables, demographic
variables, and other variables. Similar to Helms, property tax was used as a variable.
Bartik also included corporate tax, personal tax, sales tax, sales tax differential for
machinery, and small business tax relief. The study included public spending variables.
These were public school and higher education spending, as well as police and fire
protection spending. Highway density and welfare spending were also included. The
rationale for including these variables was the same as Helms, in that Bartik was to show
that firm location was impacted by how the money generated from taxes was spent.
Other variables included were banking variables; market supply vs demand variables,
demographics, and other variables such as unionization and environmental regulations.
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Bartik found that the panel data analysis results were more economically sound
than those of the cross section approach. Bartik’s results were that tax cuts have a small
but positive effect on location decisions. However, when the tax cuts led to a reduction
in public services that help business related activities there was a reduction in the number
of small firms entering the market. Improving roads is a good example of these public
services. In Goetz (1987), the author had the same result. In that paper the conclusion
was that, for the long term, rural counties that want to attract fruits and vegetables,
confectionary products, or fats and oils processors should invest in the transportation
infrastructure. While this is not pertinent to this study, future studies of the LFCP would
be able to take this in to account since counties in the program will now receive funding
for roads.
With regards to the literature on general business climate and its effect on
business location, one focus is on environmental regulation. Environmental regulation is
important to our study because LFCP is a relaxing of zoning regulations. These zoning
regulations have restrictions on how far a facility must be from water. The LFCP can be
looked at as a reduction of environmental regulation. Gray (1997) examined the effect of
state level pollution regulation on firm births. Gray used Poisson and conditional logit
models as well as a linear regression model in the study. Determining the model of
choice is dependent upon whether or not a variable changes in all areas in the study or
just one. As Gray explains it, if environmental regulation becomes stricter in all areas the
Poisson model is a better fit. This is because it would account for this change and all
states would have less new firms, whereas in the conditional logit model there would be
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no effect. Bartik (1988) and Stafford (2000) also used the conditional logit model in their
papers.
Gray used data from the Census Bureau to determine firm birth rates at five year
intervals. He then divided this number by the number of existing plants for each state to
account for differences in scale. Similar to the previous papers discussed, Gray
controlled for taxes, factor prices, and labor characteristics. He included state-level
environmental regulation variables that include state regulatory spending and business
pollution abatement spending. Those industries that had abatement costs that were
greater than 3% of total shipment were considered as high pollution industries. Other
variables included were on political support. This would be membership in conservation
programs, congressional voting records, and an index of state laws.
Gray concluded that states with stricter regulations tended to have a lower number
of new firms. These results are the same as Stafford’s (2000), who was evaluating the
effects of environmental regulation on location decisions of hazardous waste facilities.
However, in contrast to both of these papers, Bartik (1988) showed that state level
environmental policies had only a small and in some cases a statistically insignificant
impact on location. The studies in environmental regulation are not unanimous on what
the actual impacts environmental regulation has on firms.
Azzam et al. (2014) examined the effect of environmental regulations on the
structure of the hog industry using a long run competitive equilibrium model that
determines output and the number of firms simultaneously. The industry is divided into
two categories: small hog farms (<2000 head) and large hog farms (> 2000 head). In
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addition to a measure of environmental stringency, Azzam et al. (2014) considered the
price of corn, the price of hogs, the price of transportation, and the percentage of small
and large hog farms on contracts. Results showed that environmental regulation
decreased the number of large farm operations.
Another focus of business climate literature is anti-corporate laws. Schroeter et
al. (2006) examined the effect of Nebraska’s anti-corporate law on cattle feeding.
Nebraska’s law, Initiative 300, put restrictions on corporations’ ability to operate within
the state. The aim of the study was to determine how the law had changed the
distribution of the feedlot industry shares of annual marketings between the seven size
categories. Those seven size categories included: (1) <1K, (2) 1-2K, (3) 2-4K, (4) 4-8K,
(5) 8-16K, (6) 16-32K, and (7) >32K. For methodology, Schroeter et al. (2006) estimated
time-varying transition probabilities of a Markovian model that describes the transition of
farms from one size category to another in states with and without anti-corporate laws.
The time transition parameters were allowed to vary with profitability of cattle feeding,
proxied by the cattle/corn price ratio. Results of this study showed that Initiative 300 had
no significant impact on the dynamics of the cattle feeding industry. However, the
authors did note that the cattle feeding industry in Nebraska is unique in that it has a
larger percentage of smaller feeding operations than those of other large cattle feeding
states.
The third focus of the literature on business location is antitrust enforcement.
Feinberg (2014) researched the effect of state antitrust on small firm entry. He evaluated
the different firm sizes with three different statistical specifications which were: Tobit
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regression with fixed state effects and then with random effects, and a seeminglyunrelated regression. He evaluated the entry rate of small firms in the manufacturing,
wholesale, and retail industries with three employment sizes. Similar to previous studies,
he used unionization and population as explanatory variables. He also included variables
of gross state product per capita and unemployment. Feinberg also accounted for
whether states had a Republican governor and a Republican Attorney General. To
represent anti-trust enforcement, the author used antitrust cases per gross state product,
horizontal antitrust cases per gross state product, and non-horizontal antitrust cases per
gross state product. He also used the four year average of these variables. The study
showed that small retail and wholesale firms have a small but positive response to state
antitrust enforcement. Those firms that were larger had the opposite response.
While much of the literature deals with industries outside of agriculture, their
respective frameworks are still useful insofar as identifying variables useful in studying
firm entry and exit. The LFCP is different than any of the policies examined in the
literature. But, the goal of it is still to influence firm location decisions. Thus, when data
permits, this study will incorporate some of the ideas from the literature when evaluating
the impact of LFCP on livestock farms in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 4: ECONOMETRIC MODEL, DATA, AND RESULTS
4.1 Econometric Model and Data
The underlying theory that guides the specification of the econometric model in
this thesis is the theory of long-run perfectly competitive equilibrium. The two
cornerstones of the theory are perfect competition, meaning that firms (cattle producers
and hog producers, in this case) are all price takers and as such no individual producer
can affect the price they receive for their output or the price they pay for their inputs; and
free entry and exit thereby driving economic profits to zero in the long run. The
mechanism can be illustrated as follows. Imagine that firms are initially in equilibrium,
and the industry to which they belong is a constant-cost industry, i.e., the prices of inputs
the firms use for production do not rise as the industry expands. For a given supply, a
shift in demand for industry output increases the price of the product, creating short-run
profits. As seen in Figure 4.1, this would be a shift from D1 to D2 which would increase
prices from $14 to $18. Short-run profits attract new firms to enter the industry. As
more firms enter, industry supply increases causing output price to decline to the point
where economic profits are again zero. In Figure 4.1 this would be the shift of supply
from S1 to S2. Price would now be back at the original price level before the shift in
demand. The new equilibrium in the market will now constitute a different number of
firms and with different levels of output. When introducing an added cost such as
environmental regulation, the marginal and average cost of every producer also increases,
resulting in lesser short-run profits. This would mean that fewer new firms would enter
the market when there is a shift in demand. The LFCP is a reduction of the
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environmental regulations. This means that the marginal and average cost of producers
would be reduced compared to those not in the LFCP. This would mean that short-run
profits would be greater than if there was no LFCP. Therefore, when comparing to a

Figure 4.1: The Long-Run And Short-Run Effects Of A Shift In Demand from Krugman and Wells (2012)

situation where there is no LFCP, a higher number of firms should theoretically enter the
market when there is a shift in demand. According to Azzam et al. (2014), what happens
to the equilibrium number of firms and volume of output in the long-run hinges on how
regulation affects marginal cost relative to average cost.
To be consistent with theory, the empirical model for studying the impact of
LFCP on firm entry should have cattle and hog farm numbers as dependent variables.
The independent variables should include supply and demand shifters for livestock, and
other control variables in addition to a variable that indicates which counties have the
livestock friendly designation and which do not. The null hypothesis is that, after
accounting for other factors affecting livestock farm numbers, there is no difference
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between the equilibrium number of farms in counties with and without livestock friendly
designation.
Specifically, the econometric model to be estimated for cattle farms is:
Equation 1: NCAT = f(LFD, LNCAT, YLFD, LFDN, ETH, ETHN, CPLANT,
CPLANTN, PCATD, PCORND, POPD, CATDENS, LCSHARE, INCD, CRD1-CRD7,
INTER1-INTER7),
and the econometric model to be estimated for hog farms is:
Equation 2: NHOG = g(LFD, LHNOG, YLFD, LFDN, ETH, ETHN, HPLANT,
HPLANTN, PHOGD, PCORND, POPD, CATDENS, LCSHARE, INCD, CRD1-CRD7,
INTER1-INTER7).
In what follows, each variable is defined, followed by an explanation of how it is
measured, why it is included in the model, and, in parentheses, the data source from
which the variable was obtained.
NCAT = Number of cattle farms in a county for each census. While it may be argued that
LFCP only affects feedlots, it is reasonable to assume that joining the program affects the
perception of that county to all producers. So even smaller producers perceive the county
as livestock friendly and therefore see it as more accepting of any livestock development.
(Sources: USDA 2012b; USDA 2002).
NHOG = Number of hog farms in a county for each census. (Sources: USDA 2012b;
USDA 2002).
LFD = Dummy variable for LFCP. The variable is assigned a value of 1 if a county has
livestock friendly designation and zero otherwise. It also takes in to account the when a
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county joined the LFCP. Those counties that were designated in 2007 were included in
the time period from 2002-2007. This would mean that being designated in 2007 still had
an impact on 2007 cattle farm numbers. The reasoning for including this is that counties
would have had to make adjustments to their regulations before being designated. So
they were already acting as a livestock friendly county before they were officially
designated. This same reasoning is used for including counties that were designated in
2012 in the 2008-2012 time period. Since stringent environmental regulation is known to
raise (private) costs, possibly making firm entry into the industry more difficult, one
should expect LFD to affect cattle numbers and hog numbers positively. (Source: NDA
2015a).
LNCAT = NCAT from the previous census. Following Gray (1997), this variable
controls for differences in scale across counties and assumes the number of farms during
the current census is proportional to farms in the previous census. The coefficient of the
variable is expected to be positive and less than 1.
LNHOG =NHOG from the previous census. The rationale for including this variable is
the same used for including NCAT. The Coefficient of this variable is also expected to
be positive and less than 1.
YLFD = Number of years that a county has been in LFCP. This is included to determine
if being in the program longer had increased effect on livestock development. The dates
for when each county joined the program are in Appendix A. The coefficient of this
variable is expected to be positive as being in the program longer may allow the program
to take full effect.

23
LFDN = Dummy variable for presence (absence) of neighboring county in LFCP. The
variable is equal to 1 if a neighboring county has livestock friendly designation and zero
otherwise. The reason for including this variable was to determine if having a
neighboring county in the LFCP could impact livestock expansion. Wasylenko (1997)
found that when there was a large difference in the average tax rates between economic
rival states there was a significant impact in firm location. Based on these studies the
expected result is for the coefficient to be negative. This would be because new
producers could decide to locate their facilities in a livestock friendly county in order to
take advantage of lowered zoning regulations.
ETH = Dummy variable for presence (absence) of ethanol plants. Ethanol has had a large
impact on livestock feeding practices with the increases in corn prices and the
introduction of dried distiller’s grains. To capture the effect of ethanol, ETH is set to 1 if
a county has an ethanol plant and zero otherwise (Source: NEB 2015). The variable also
includes when an ethanol plant was built. The effect of this variable on livestock farm
numbers is ambiguous because while ethanol production may increase corn prices, it also
provides a substitute in the form of distiller’s grains, especially for cattle.
ETHN = Dummy variable for presence (absence) of ethanol plants in neighboring
counties. Ethanol plants receive corn from producers from outside of their county and
can sell distillers grains outside of their county as well. Therefore an ethanol plant has an
impact on those outside of its respective county. Hence ETHN takes a value of 1 if a
neighboring county has an ethanol plant and zero otherwise (Source: NEB 2015).
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CPLANT = Dummy variable for presence (absence) of a beef processing plants in a
county. It takes a value of 1 if a county contains a beef processing plant, and zero
otherwise. The reason for including this variable is that having a beef processor close
would allow producers to easily sell their cattle. As this may result in higher entry of
cattle farms, the coefficient of this variable is expected to be positive. (Source: compiled
by the author).
CPLANTN = Dummy variable for presence (absence) of a beef processing plant in
neighboring counties. The variable takes the value of 1 if neighboring county has a beef
processing plant and zero otherwise. Presence of a beef processing plant in neighboring
counties, by giving more outlets for cattle, should have a positive impact on entry into
cattle production. (Source: compiled by the author).
HPLANT = Same as CPLANT but for hogs. (Source: compiled by the author).
HPLANTN = Same as CPLANTN but for hogs. (Source: compiled by the author).
PCATD = Average price of cattle per hundred pounds in Nebraska between two
censuses. The prices for 2011 and 2012 were not available through NASS. Therefore the
prices from 2007-2010 were averaged. Driven by demand and supply for beef, the price
of cattle is a major determinant of profitability in cattle production and, thereby, a driver
of entry and exit of operations in the industry. The price of steers, heifers, and GE 500lbs
was used as those prices seemed to be the most representative of an average producer.
(Source: USDA 2015). The effect of the price of cattle on farm entry is expected to be
positive.
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PHOGD = Average price of hogs per hundred pounds in Nebraska between censuses.
Similar to the price of cattle, hog prices for 2011 and 2012 are unavailable through
NASS, therefore the prices from 2007-2010 were averaged. Also driven by supply and
demand for pork, hog prices are major determinants of hog profitability and, hence, entry
and exit of hog farms. Therefore, the coefficient on the hog price variable is also
expected to be positive. (Source: USDA 2015).
PCORND = Average price of corn per bushel in Nebraska between censuses. Since corn
is a major input in livestock production, the price of corn is also a major determinant of
livestock profitability and, hence, supply of cattle. An increase in this price would
decrease profitability. For this reason, it is expected that the coefficient of the price of
corn will be negative (Source: USDA 2015).
POPD = Average of population density between two censuses. The expectation is that the
higher the population density is in county the smaller the number of livestock farms.
(Source: US BEA 2015).
CATDENS = Cattle density (cattle numbers by land area). This variable was included to
examine if higher cattle density affects cattle or hog farm numbers. The hypothesis is
that a higher cattle density would mean that a county is highly livestock friendly.
LCSHARE = Cattle numbers in a county as a percent of cattle numbers in the entire
state during the previous census. This variable shows the economic importance of cattle
production to a county. The expectation is that this variable will be positive. Having
cattle production have a substantial economic impact should increase farm numbers.
This would be because the livestock industry is important to the economy of a county and
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they will continue to support and develop this industry. The variable was included in the
hog model instead of a hog share variable due to undisclosed census data for hog
numbers for several counties. (Sources: USDA 2012b; USDA 2002).
INCD = Average per capita personal income for each county between censuses. Higher
per capita personal income could mean several things. It could mean that producers have
more income, allowing them to build new facilities. It could also be the result of higher
labor costs in a county. Counties with higher per capita personal income may also be
resistant to new livestock farms being built. Consequently, the effect of the variable on
livestock farm numbers is ambiguous. (Source: US BEA 2015).
CRD = A dummy variable that corresponds to the crop reporting district the county is
located in. The eight CRDs are; Northwest, North, Northeast, Southwest, Central, East,
South, Southeast (see the map in Appendix B). The CRD dummy variable assumes that
heterogeneity between clusters of counties within a CRD is more important than
heterogeneity of all the 93 counties in the states. (Source: Nebraska DED 2015).
INTER =Interaction between LFD and CRD. The hypothesis is that the impact of LFD
on farm numbers is not independent from the CRD in which a county is located. The
Southwest and Central CRDs did not have any LFD counties as of 2012.
All prices and income were deflated by the CPI with base year of 1997. All
livestock and price data are average prices for the state of Nebraska. Prices at the county
level are not available. Hence, the empirical model, to be discussed in the next section,
accounts only for yearly variation in prices, not variation of prices across counties. In
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others words, all counties face the same prices during the same census years. Prices are
taken to be exogenous to each county.
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4.2 Estimation Results
4.2.1 Cattle Models Results
Since livestock friendly designation (LFD) is the key variable, the econometric
models of cattle farm numbers and hog farm numbers described in section 4.1 were each
estimated using three different versions or models to verify the robustness of the effect of
the designation. The three models were estimated using a fixed effects model with
correction for heteroscedasticity when the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected.
Heteroscedasticity was only found in Model 3 of cattle farms. Due to the large number
of counties, the heterogeneity of counties is captured by including dummy variables of
CRDs instead of counties. The assumption is that, while the characteristics of the cluster
of counties within a CRD are invariant within a CRD, the characteristics of CRDs vary
across the state. A map of the CRDs can be found in Appendix B. The assumption
ensures that the regression results are not drained of statistical power to test the effect of
LFCP and the control variables because of too many dummy variables. There were 279
observations for cattle and 268 observations for hogs.
Model 1 for cattle includes all the variables discussed in section 4.1 in equation 1.
A list of all the variables and their results can be found in Table 4.1. Results show that
LFD is positive and highly significant, indicating that, all else equal, farm numbers in
counties with livestock friendly designation are higher than those counties without the
designation. The other statistically significant coefficients at a minimum of the 10%
level are LNCAT, YLFD, PCATD, PCORND, LCSHARE, INCD INTER1, and
INTER3. Those that were highly statistically significant at the 1% level are LNCAT,
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PCATD, PCORND, and INTER3. YLFD and LCSHARE were both statistically
significant at the 5% level.
The result for LNCAT is consistent with expectation. The coefficient is both
positive and less than 1. This means that current farm levels are highly dependent on past
levels. LCSHARE also had a positive coefficient as expected. This implies that the
economic importance of cattle to a county attracts new cattle farms. The effect of county
income (INCD) is negative, thus counties with higher levels of income have a smaller
number of cattle farms. Contrary to expectation, the coefficient for YLFD is negative,
implying that being in the program longer has a negative effect on cattle farms. One
possible explanation for this would be that those counties that joined early have other
unexplained factors leading to the decrease in cattle numbers. These factors may have
been one reason that led to the county joining the program. In looking at prices, PCATD
was positive. This means that, all else equal, higher cattle prices have a positive impact
on cattle farms. The outcome is what is expected as increases in cattle prices means
increased livestock profitability. However, the coefficient of the price of corn
(PCORND) had a sign that is counter to what was expected. The coefficient was positive
indicating that an increase in price would lead to an increase in cattle farms. But
increases in the corn price would decrease profitability which should discourage firm
entry, all else equal. The reason for this unexpected result may be due to the introduction
of dried distiller’s grains (DDGS). It became a common substitute for corn in livestock
production. Price of DDGS could not be incorporated in the model due to a high
correlation with the price of corn. Lastly, the INTER1 and INTER3 variables both had

30
negative coefficients. The ETH, ETHN, CPLANT, and CPLANTN variables were all
found to be insignificant.
Model 2 drops the variables ETH, ETHN, CPLANT, and CPLANTN and, rather
than considering the prices of cattle (PCATD) and corn (PCORND) separately, the prices
are expressed as a ratio (PRATIOC). The variables ETH, ETHN, CPLANT, AND
CPLANTN were dropped because they were all found to be statistically insignificant. A
price ratio was used to correct for correlation between corn price and income. Again, the
coefficient of LFD was positive and highly significant. The other statistically significant
variables that are significant at the 1% level are LNCAT, PRATIOC, LCSHARE, INCD,
and INTER3. Those that are significant at the 10% level are YLFD, CRD3, CRD5,
INTER1, and INTER7. The result for LNCAT was again as expected: positive and less
than one. The LCSHARE variable was also positive. The coefficient of the beef/corn
price ratio is negative, contrary to expectation. When the ratio increases, one would
expect profitability to increase and thus there would be an increase in farm numbers. The
reason that the ratio is negative may also be due to the introduction of DDGS. When
corn prices began to increase after the introduction of the Renewable Fuels Standard so
did production of DDGS, which are used as a substitute to corn. The variable INCD had
the opposite sign as that of Model 1 and was positive. This would mean that as income
was increasing so were cattle farms. The change in the sign may be due to lesser
correlation between income and prices when expressed as a ratio. Lastly there are the
CRD and INTER variables. CRD3 and CRD5 were both positive. These would be the
Northeast and Central CRDs. This coefficient tells us that counties in CRD3 and CRD5
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had on average, holding all other variables constant, 15 and 17 more farms than CRD8.
The INTER variables INTER1, INTER3, and INTER7 all had negative coefficients. That
would mean that LFD counties in these areas have on average fewer cattle farms than
those in INTER8.
Model 3 uses the same variables as Model 2 except that dummy variables for the
census years are substituted for the price ratio. YR2 and YR3 correspond to years 2007
and 2012 with the base year being 2002. This was done because the prices that were used
did not vary between counties. This meant that there is perfect correlation between
census years and prices. Again, LFD is highly statistically significant and positive. The
other variables in Model 3 that were statistically significant at the 1% level were
LNCAT, YR2, YR3, INTER1, INTER3, and INTER7. YLFD was significant at the 5%
level and LCSHARE and INCD were significant at the 10% level.
Since the coefficient of LFD is robustly positive and statistically significant at the
1% level across the three model specifications, it is safe to conclude that, after controlling
for other factors that affect farms numbers, the effect of LFD is positive for cattle.
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Table 4.1 Results: Cattle Farms As Dependent Variable
Model 1
Intercept
Livestock Friendly
Designation

Coefficient
-381.573***
67.722***

Model 2

Std. Error
53.557
19.373

Model 3

Coefficient
13.627
86.047***

Std. Error
21.023
21.365

Coefficient
72.402***
67.360***

Std. Error
20.859
7.323

0.868***

0.021***

0.822***

0.022

0.869***

0.025

-6.799**

2.703

-5.239*

2.996

-6.565**

2.968

-3.793

5.893

8.690

6.180

-3.959

5.985

0.852
-2.057

6.114
4.694

-13.236

Lag of Cattle Farms
Years in LFCP
Neighboring county
in LFCP
Ethanol plant
Ethanol plant in
neigh. county
Beef proc. plant

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

-

8.622

-

-

-

-

2.271

5.223

-

-

-

-

Cattle Price

4.026***

0.712

-

-

-

-

Corn Price

64.234***

6.514

-

-

-

-

-

-

Beef proc. plant in
neigh. county

-

-

-1.613***

0.288

0.0184
0.011

0.0142
0.046

-0.012
-0.076

0.014
0.049

Lag of county share
of total production

0.093**

0.044

0.140***

0.048

0.094*

0.057

Per capita income
Northwest CRD1

-1.263*

0.667

1.904***

0.585

-1.207*

0.687

-0.409
-2.758
6.135
-0.569
8.880
-1.055

9.973
8.996
8.174
9.474
9.759
8.028

-10.903
2.783
15.206*
-14.428
17.625*
3.169

10.842
9.759
8.927
10.213
10.097
8.341

-0.182
-2.414
5.460
-0.953
5.577
-0.645

7.899
8.011
7.394
7.212
8.952
5.792

Cattle/corn price
ratio
YR2
YR3
Pop. density
Cattle density

North CRD2
Northeast CRD3
Southwest CRD4
Central CRD5
East CRD6
South CRD7
INTER1
INTER2
INTER3
INTER4
INTER7
Num. of Obsv.
R-Square/Adj R-Sq
1

-70.878***
-60.844***
0.009
0.003

9.637
7.591
0.011
0.049

-8.879
-39.611*
-32.688
-75.994***
-30.172
-40.555
279

9.596
22.498
29.583
27.282
25.23
26.288

-14.262
-48.131*
-38.568
-83.462***
-29.691
-49.168*
279

10.436
24.934
32.837
30.198
28.090
29.153

-8.225
-40.269***
-31.760
-73.715***
-30.412
-43.310***
279

6.681
15.658
55.015
16.549
21.853
15.59

0.962

0.958

0.952

0.948

0.962

0.958

0.2412
0.5535
0.0172
Chi-Square
Notes: *Statistically significant at 10%, **Statistically significant at 5%, ***Statistically significant at 1%
1
Test statistic for heteroscedasticiy using the White test. Homoscedasticity was rejected in Model 3.
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4.2.2 Hog Models Results
Since LFD is also the key variable in the hog model, three models were used to
test for the robustness of this variable. Model 1 uses all the variables mentioned in 4.1 in
equation 2. In Model 1 LFD was found to be positive but not statistically significant.
This means, all else equal, differences in hog farm numbers between counties cannot be
explained by LFD. Variables that are statistically significant at the 1% level are
LNHOG, PHOGD, CATDENS, CRD3, and CRD5. Those that are significant at the 5%
level are PCORND, AND CRD2. The result for LNHOG is what was expected with a
coefficient that was both positive and under 1. This implies that current hog farm
numbers are closely associated with past levels. Prices for corn and hogs were both
negative. The PHOGD coefficient being negative is contrary to expectation. This would
mean that hog farms would decrease when the price of hogs increased. However, an
increase in hog prices should move farm entry in the opposite direction. This result could
be due to a structural shift in the hog industry towards larger hog farms. PCORND
having a negative coefficient is as expected. Increases in the price of corn reduce
profitability and as such reduce new firm entry. The result for cattle density was positive
and statistically significant. This implies that when cattle density is high there will be
more hog farms. One explanation of this could be that areas with high cattle density are
more receptive to adding more livestock. The last variables that were significant are
CRD2, CRD3, and CRD5. These all had coefficients that were negative. These results
tell us that on average, holding all else constant, counties in these crop reporting districts
had less hog farms compared to what.
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Model 2 removes the variables ETH, ETHN, HPLANT, and HPLANTN and,
rather than considering the prices of hogs and corn separately, the prices are expressed as
a ratio (PRATIOH). Again, LFD is found to be statistically insignificant. The variables
that are statistically significant at the 1% level are LNHOG, CATDENS, CRD5, and
CRD7. Those that are significant at the 5% are PRATIOH, INCD, and CRD4. Lastly,
those that are significant at the 10% level are CRD1 and CRD2. The result for LNHOG
is as expected with a coefficient that is positive and less than 1. CATDENS is again,
contrary to what is expected, positive. The coefficient of the hog/corn price ratio
(PRATIOH) has a positive and statistically significant coefficient. This is consistent with
expectation because as the ratio increases there would be an increase in profitability
which should lead to increased entry. In this model, INCD has a positive coefficient.
This means that areas with increased income have more hog farms. The change in the
sign from Model 1 may be due to lesser correlation between income and prices when the
latter are expressed as a ratio. The CRD variables are all negative and none are
statistically significant.
Model 3 has the same variables as Model 2 except the price ratio has been
replaced by dummy variables for census years. This was done because the prices that
were used did not vary between counties. This means that there is high correlation
between time and prices. LFD is still insignificant in this model. It was found to be
insignificant in all three models. The variables that were significant at the 1% level are
LNHOG, YR2, CATDENS, CRD3, CRD5, and CRD7. CRD2 was significant at the 5%
level.
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Contrary to the results from the cattle model, the variable LFD for the hog model
was not statistically different from zero under all three specifications of the three models.
Therefore we can conclude that, after controlling for other factors, LFD has no impact on
the number of hog farms.
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Table 4.2 Results: Hog Farms As Dependent Variable
Model 1
Intercept
Livestock Friendly
Designation
Lag of Hog Farms
Years in LFCP
Neighboring county
in LFCP
Ethanol plant in
county
Ethanol plant in
neighboring county
Pork proc. plant in
county
Pork proc. plant in
neigh. county
Hog Price
Corn Price
Hog/corn price ratio
YR2
YR3
Population density
Cattle density
Lag of county share
of total production
Per capita income
Northwest CRD
North CRD
Northeast CRD
Southwest CRD
Central CRD
East CRD
South CRD
INTER1
INTER2
INTER3
INTER4
INTER7
Num. of Obsv.
R-Square/Adj R-Sq
Chi-Square

1

Coefficient
107.557***

Model 2

Std. Error
17.827

Coefficient
-16.181**

Model 3

Std. Error
6.749

Coefficient
5.083

Std. Error
5.384

5.618

3.712

5.242

2.236

2.236

0.543***

0.016

0.502***

0.015

0.547***

0.016

-0.471

0.743

-0.490

0.794

-0.420

0.738

-2.053

1.651

0.125

1.696

-2.174

1.618

1.657

-

-

-

-

1.001

1.331

-

-

-

-

1.999

3.207

-

-

-

-

1.869

1.783

-

-

-

-

-2.731***
-2.412**
0.001
0.046***

0.442
1.275
0.003
0.012

0.009

0.008

0.826

-0.128
-1.883
-5.022**
-6.421***
-1.365
-8.255***
-3.111
-6.319
0.995
-1.595
1.002
-3.607
-0.164
268
0.931
0.211

0.190
2.665
2.393
2.305
2.608
2.637
2.176
2.682
6.295
10.507
7.536
7.000
7.287

6.613

0.483**
-0.003
0.049***
0.007
0.428**
-4.733*
-4.781*
-3.518
-5.339**
-8.149***
-1.657
-9.418***
-0.603
-4.866
-1.906
-2.691
-0.913

0.197
0.004
0.012

-8.536***
1.719
0.001
0.045***

2.203
1.713
0.003
0.012

0.084

0.009

0.008

0.178
2.748
2.509
2.390
2.623
2.720
2.201
2.739
6.54074
11.059
7.948
7.350
7.658
268

0.923

0.919

0.912
0.930

-0.084
0.185
-2.032
2.590
-5.211**
2.334
-6.253***
2.264
-2.181
2.489
-8.899***
2.532
-2.861
2.055
-6.998***
2.575
-0.889
6.081
-2.400
10.288
0.187
7.396
-4.871
6.841
-1.689
7.120
268
0.930
0.924
0.997

Notes: *Statistically significant at 10%, **Statistically significant at 5%, ***Statistically significant at 1% ;
1
Test statistic for heteroscedasticiy using the White test. Homoskedasticity was not rejected in all three models.
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CHAPTER 5: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This thesis draws on the theory of long-run perfect competition equilibrium to
evaluate the impact of the livestock friendly county program on cattle and hog farms in
Nebraska. The LFCP is a volunteer program that counties in Nebraska can sign up for.
The NDA sets guidelines on zoning regulations for livestock facilities. Counties may be
required to modify their zoning setbacks in order to be admitted in to the program. Since,
to the author’s knowledge, there has been no study on a program such as LFCP, insights
from the literature on how taxes, business climate, and anti-corporate laws have been
utilized in specifying the model. The evaluation of the LFCP is conducted separately for
cattle farm numbers per county and hog farm numbers per county using census data.
Results for cattle farms show that the LFCP had a positive and significant
association with cattle farm numbers. This result was robust in all three models that were
estimated. This means that we can reject the null hypothesis that the LFCP had no effect.
In the case of hog farms the result was that the LFCP was positively associated with hog
farm numbers but the association is not statistically significant. In this case we fail to
reject the null hypothesis that LFCP has no effect. This result may be due to counties
having more stringent regulations for hog farms despite the livestock friendly
designation.
Further research looking at the details of zoning regulations for each county and
how strict they are would give more definitive results. This would also be useful in
determining how strict the NDA enforces the zoning guidelines. Further research could
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also be done including the LFCP incentive that gives counties money for road
construction that was included in 2015.
A major limitation of this study is not accounting for cattle and hog price
variation across counties across time because of unavailability of county level price data.
How the absence of such variation affects the results is hard to say. However, if county
prices are proportional to the average price at the state level, the conclusions should not
differ.
Despite the limitations, this is the first analytical study that provides a glimpse at
the effectiveness of a state policy that aims to promote more livestock production. It is
hoped that the study will generate further interest in studying the impact of LFCP, in
particular and environmental regulation, in general, on entry and exit decisions of
livestock facilities in the state of Nebraska.
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APPENDIX A
number County
1 Morrill
2 Hitchcock
3 Webster
4 Keith
5 Dawes
6 Wayne
7 Adams
8 Garden
9 Lincoln
10 Sheridan
11 Box Butte
12 Deuel
13 Jefferson
14 Grant
15 Gage
16 Scotts Bluff
17 Saline
18 Cuming
19 Kimball
20 Banner
21 Holt
22 Johnson
23 Dodge
24 Otoe
25 Dawson
26 Merrick
27 Pawnee
28 Knox
29 Saunders

designation date
2005 June 15
2006 March 9
2006 March 9
2007 March 1
2007 August 6
2007 August 15
2007 August 29
2007 October 12
2008 August 12
2008 August 12
2008 August 12
2009 February 6
2009 June 22
2010 August 2
2012 May 2
2012 May 21
2012 July 20
2012 August 10
2012 September 25
2012 September 25
2012 November 30
2013 August 16
2013 November 27
2014 February 25
2014 March 25
2014 March 25
2014 July 25
2014 October 28
2014 December 16

Figure A.1: Livestock Friendly Designation By Date of State Designation
Notes: Compiled By Professor J. David Aiken
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APPENDIX B

Figure B.1: NDED Crop Reporting Districts.
Notes: for crd Northwest=1, North=2, Northeast=3, Southwest=4, Central=5, East=6, South=7, Southeast=8

